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Abstract 
Starr Small 
Forming Family in the European Union: New Social Risks and Welfare Responses 
(Under the direction of Dr. John Stephens) 
 
 Social transformations have brought new risks for family formation which national 
welfare states have tried to address with varied success.  Analyzing Spain and Sweden’s 
historical legacies, this essay argues that they have played a determining role in their national 
welfare states’ ability to adapt to the new social risks.  The relative success of Sweden and 
failure of Spain to resolve the conflicts facing family formation underscores the diversity of 
national welfare policy toward families within the European Union.  Facing this national 
diversity, this essay examines how the EU develops coordination and convergence strategies 
for its member-states in female employment, reconciliation, and gender equality.  Although 
less clear in Sweden, a moderate “Europeanization effect” of family policy appears to be 
emerging in Spain.  This implies that as national welfare states attempt to assimilate EU 
family policy targets, the EU gains greater potential to influence social policy. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 The entry of women into paid employment in Europe marked an important social 
transformation for family and welfare arrangements.  In transitioning from ‘old social 
risks,’ welfare regimes encountered a debate on how to respond to the modern problems 
facing families, from promoting female employment and gender equality to improving 
reconciliation through policies.  The various welfare regimes reacted differently to the 
demands of ‘new social risks’ and experienced varied levels of success.  By examining 
Spain and Sweden, this essay argues that historical legacies played a determining role in 
these welfare states’ adaptations to change and continue to mark their defining 
characteristics.  Notably, these two countries diverge most strongly in how they address 
family concerns.  Sweden’s progressive state-led approach to female employment and 
reconciliation policies contrasts sharply with Spain’s residual dependency on the family 
to maintain its own well-being.  The effect of these responses is evident in the relative 
success of the Swedish model and the challenges that the Spanish model confronts.  Yet, 
the risks and benefits for families are no longer confined by national boundaries.  As the 
EU envisioned a plan for advancing its economy, it simultaneously targeted 
improvements in female employment, reconciliation, and gender equality.  While 
progress is difficult to assess in Sweden’s already generous welfare state, there is some 
evidence EU coordination measures have helped Spain to converge toward EU social 
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goals.  In this way, familial states like Spain may utilize the EU as a way to recalibrate 
welfare in order to achieve improvement in family policy arenas. 
  
 
 
 I. “NEW SOCIAL RISKS” AND RESPONSES FOR FAMILIES 
As families face new social risks, a debate emerges over what responses should be 
developed that is answered distinctly by divergent welfare regimes.  First of all, this 
section will outline the transition from “old” social risks to “new social risks” and the 
welfare changes it implies.  Secondly, this section focuses on the challenges for families 
through debates on how to reconcile work and family life and promote greater gender 
equality.  Thirdly, it introduces the welfare systems of Europe and their varied responses 
to these social risks, which are particularly divergent with regard to families. 
1.  SOCIAL RISKS:  
Old Social Risks: In the postwar industrialist society, workers became integrally 
linked with their role in the labor market.  These workers thus became commodified, 
meaning that they depend on labor-force participation to earn income and benefits to 
maintain their well-being.  The strict division of labor between men and women during 
this period guaranteed that the connection to the labor market would be generally built 
around a male worker acting as the breadwinner for his family (Bonoli 2007: 496).  The 
greatest threats to well-being thus occurred when the (male) breadwinner was unable to 
work.  Including sickness, invalidity, old age, and unemployment, these “old social risks” 
jeopardized a family’s welfare (Bonoli 2007: 496).  However, states tried to offset these 
threats through intervention.  
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 In this way, all western European countries “developed comprehensive systems of 
social protection and labor market regulation by providing coverage against the main 
traditional risks” (Bonoli 2007: 501).  These programs were “transfer-heavy, oriented 
towards covering risks from the loss of earnings capacity due to old age, unemployment, 
sickness, and invalidity” (Huber and Stephens 2004).  Specific policies included cash and 
service benefits for old age, survivor, sickness, disability, and unemployment (Esping-
Andersen 1990, Bonoli 2007).  These welfare programs mirrored the patterns of work 
and family dominant at the time by generally benefiting the male breadwinner.  Women 
benefited from these entitlements from their relation to the male-breadwinner (Bonoli 
2007).  Although these welfare programs were suited to the industrial society, time has 
wrought significant changes in social risks.  Some old social risks continue to merit 
attention: people still become sick, disabled, unemployed and old (Huber and Stephens 
2004).  However, as family and work arrangements altered with time, new risks emerged 
for society. 
New Social Risks:  Social transformations brought new risks to modern 
postindustrial society.  These social transformations included the “de-industrialization 
and tertiarization of employment, the massive entry of women into the labor force, 
increased instability of family structures, and the de-standardization of employment” 
(Bonoli 2007: 498).  Understandably, new challenges to social well-being followed the 
changes.  These “new” social risks no longer center upon a male breadwinner model or 
even one particular group (Huber and Stephens 2004), although they seem to affect 
women and youth more strongly (Bonoli 2007).  Also, it is notable that new social risks 
affect both youth and adults, having a greater impact across a life-course.  Generally, new 
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social risks especially focus on family, changes in the labor market, and welfare reform 
(Moreno and Palier 2005: 5).  Specifically, they include “precarious employment, long-
term unemployment, being a working poor, single parenthood or the inability to reconcile 
work and family life” (Bonoli 2007: 495).  As these needs change, the former provision 
standards for welfare no longer match the emerging needs (Ferrera 2003).  For instance, 
the increased elderly population requires governments to redefine their pension and 
retirement patterns (Ferrera 2003: 2).  The traditional welfare state was not designed for 
the new social risks. 
Modern welfare states continue to try to adapt and address these new risks.  Huber 
and Stephens characterize the ‘new’ welfare state as “more service-heavy, oriented 
towards increasing the earnings capacity of individuals through support for continuing 
education, training and re-training, and the socialization of care work to facilitate 
combining paid work with raising a family” (Huber and Stephens 2004).  Welfare 
provisions need to be updated to better address new social demands, like gender equality 
and equity (Ferrera 2003: 13).  One important dimension is how these risks relate to the 
family. 
New Social Risks for Families:  The massive entry of women into the labor force 
represented a key social transformation generating the new social risks facing families.  
The industrial societies divided labor by gender: men into paid work and women into 
unpaid domestic and care work.  However, in the 1970s, starting in northern Europe, 
women gradually began to enter into labor markets (Bonoli 2007: 499).  This social 
transformation greatly altered the European labor force and brought significant changes.  
From 1960-1990, the European labor force grew by over thirty million people, with 
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women representing twenty-five million of these workers (Bernhardt 2007).  However, as 
women entered into the labor force, they often faced (and continue to face) the challenge 
of replacing their previous unpaid domestic work.  Working women, mothers in 
particular, highlight the changing social demands of the family.  Modern social risks for 
family include the problems of reconciliation (balancing employment with family life and 
child-rearing) and continued gender inequalities. 
 New risks for families have great social consequence, since they affect the 
formation of families and thus demography.  Social welfare schemes in Europe rely on 
intergenerational solidarity, meaning the working generation often supports the retirees.  
Thus, changing levels of fertility affect the social protection system (Fernández 2007: 6).  
Over time, life expectancy has improved and the average fertility rates in Europe have 
declined greatly.  The average fertility declined in the EU 15 from 2.72 children per 
woman in 1965 to a minimum of 1.42 in 1995 (a decline of 46%) before going back up to 
1.5 by 2002 (Fernández 2007: 3).  Thus, in what is referred to as the “graying” of Europe, 
the elderly represent an increasingly large proportion of the population, especially in the 
Southern European countries (Fernández 2007:2).   Not a single EU country reaches the 
replacement rate of approximately two children per woman.  The drop in fertility rates 
does not, however, necessarily reflect a reduced desire to have children.  Only a minority 
of women report wishing to remain childless (Fernández 2007: 8).  Also, the number of 
children desired is persistently higher than the effective number of children (Fernández 
2007: 8).  
Low fertility rates do not have one direct cause, but they appear related to delays 
in family formation and reconciliation policies.  A lack of supportive reconciliation 
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policies for women to enter the workforce makes it more difficult for families to have 
children (Fernández 2007: 8).  In this way, the countries with greater female labor force 
participation are the countries with higher fertility levels.  In Europe, these countries are 
most notably the Nordic countries, whose generous social protection for families seems 
to enable families to reconcile care and work.  The concern for fertility rates creates calls 
for action to overcome the difficulties in reconciling work and family. 
 
2. CHALLENGES FOR FAMILIES (AND DEBATE FOR ACTION) 
Striking a balance between work and family life is a great challenge for both men 
and women.  These problems raise debates on reconciliation, focusing on both parents’ 
roles in employment and care and potential policy tools. 
Gender at Work (Female employment):  Female participation in the labor force 
has become a priority for modern society.  It is an inherent element of the modern 
society, viewed positively as a way to boost economic competitiveness (Lisbon Agenda 
2000).  Also, women’s employment is the most critical factor in any attempt to address 
the crisis in the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 2002).  Increased employment does not 
itself necessarily lessen the desire of women to have children.  Most women now want to 
combine both employment and motherhood (Esping-Andersen 2002: 72-73).  
Participation as both workers and mothers is now desired by many women across Europe; 
however, their ability to juggle these roles depends upon the reconciliation tools 
available. 
Secondly, some authors argue that fathers’ role in employment also requires 
policy adjustment.  Reconciliation is all too often seen as a problem only facing women, 
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when in actuality it implicates the fathers (Knijn and Komter 2004: xiv).  In fact, the 
neglect of reconciliation support for fathers is evident in their reported dissatisfaction 
(Lewis 2004).  When fathers take the role of primary breadwinner, often they admit 
feeling distanced from their families (Lewis 2004).  Furthermore, surveyed fathers 
reported being preoccupied and suffering from the absence and distance from the family 
(Lewis 2004).  Paternal leave, especially paid leave or leave exclusively for fathers, has 
been shown to be a more successful reconciliation tool for fathers (Gornick and Meyers 
2003). 
Gender at Home (Who Cares?):  When women enter the workforce, they still 
must resolve the question of care.  This means they face the new challenge to replace 
their former unpaid domestic and care work.  Women often are still expected to continue 
high domestic responsibilities (Bernhardt 2007).  In fact, women still perform far more 
hours of unpaid work than men (Bernhardt 2007).  Partly due to the burden of dual 
responsibilities, most “young, childless women can reasonably expect considerable 
difficulties in combining continued workforce participation with domestic and family 
responsibilities” (Bernhardt 2007: 7).    
 Generally, husbands do not shoulder any significant increase in domestic duties 
despite the possible benefits of fathers’ involvement in care.  Husbands still do not 
contribute to domestic duties at the same level as their wives.  Although men perform 
more household and childcare work now than in the past, their hours of housework only 
marginally increase when their wives work full-time (Bernhardt 2007).  Gender division 
remains with regard to household duties.  Some argue that father involvement in care 
should be increased (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Lewis 2004).  There is evidence that 
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increased father involvement in care positively affects their children’s well-being and 
family formation (Lewis 2004).  For instance, one study showed that children achieved 
higher levels of success in school with greater participation of their father in care (Lewis 
2004).  Gornick and Myers found that fathers were more likely to participate in the care 
of children when offered stronger provisions for parental leaves and greater flexibility at 
work (2003: 263).  In most cases, however, another source of care is necessary to meet 
women’s needs in balancing work and family.  
Childcare Centers:  There seems to be a certain consensus that public care 
services are increasingly necessary to facilitate reconciliation.  When mothers enter into 
paid work, they need to find alternative sources to fulfill care duties (Bonoli 2007).  
Many authors suggest that more childcare centers, especially for younger children, would 
be a strong improvement for reconciliation (Esping-Andersen 2002, Gornick and Meyers 
2003).  With little expectation that fathers will help more with care and domestic duties, 
Esping-Andersen recommends greater institutional support, particularly that quality 
childcare should be free and universal (2002).  Statistical evidence supports the claim that 
greater availability of childcare facilities helps with reconciliation (Gornick and Meyers 
2003).  For example, Gornick and Meyers affirm that mothers in countries with strong 
programs of Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) report less serious conflicts in 
raising children (2003).  This suggests that childcare centers help individual families with 
reconciliation. 
The proponents of greater public care provision call for a re-conceptualization of 
care responsibilities.  For instance, Sevenhuijsen argues that care should not be treated 
merely as a “safety net” during transitions but instead should be recognized as a 
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continuous social event that demands daily attention (2002: 130).  Gornick and Meyers 
add the idea that children are “public goods,” meaning that society benefits as a whole 
from the care given to children (2003).  The costs of childcare should be thus be shared 
by the entire society, not just parents, care-givers, and the organizations that employ them 
(Gornick and Meyers 2003).  Daycare surfaces as a natural product of any such re-
evaluation of care as a public responsibility. 
Other Policies:  In this way, the debate on how to support families hinges on a 
differentiation between individual and collective responsibilities.  These perspectives 
seem to develop from historical traditions in various countries.  In some European 
countries, families themselves bear the largest burden in maintaining welfare (notably the 
Southern Mediterranean welfare regime).  In these countries, the family is regarded as a 
fundamental primary group that is culturally imagined in social life and permeates most 
aspects of people’s life chances (Moreno 2007).  This dependence on the family earns 
these countries the title of familial states. 
However, many authors argue that reducing such dependencies on the family 
through greater public intervention should constitute a part of reconciliation (Esping-
Andersen 2002, Lister 2004, Lewis 2004).  Lister favors such a process of de-
familialization, defining it as the degree to which adult individuals can maintain a 
socially acceptable standard of living through paid work or social provisions without 
being dependent on family (2004).  This suggests that the public sector should provide 
welfare services, like childcare facilities, so that the family no longer must resolve their 
problems single-handedly (Esping-Andersen 2002).  Lewis argues that the changing roles 
of men and women within the family require “an effort on the part of policy makers to 
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promote new forms of social solidarity, both at the levels of collective provision via 
policies to promote cash payments for care and care services (so-called de-
familialization), and within the family, by encouraging a more equal distribution of 
money and labor between men and women” (2004).  From their perspectives, policies 
need to be introduced to ease the burden of care from parents and thus facilitate 
reconciliation.  Overall, family now appears as a central concern in the debate over 
whether citizens’ social protection should be guaranteed publicly or privately (Martin 
2004).   
 
3. FORMS OF RESPONSE (WELFARE REGIME MODELS) 
Different forms of response emerged through welfare states.  This section shows how 
the various welfare regimes have tried to address these social risks in their own ways.  
These different approaches are reflected in the varying success of the regimes in coping 
with new social risks.  Southern Mediterranean states struggle the most to adapt, while 
the Scandinavian states generally transition fairly seamlessly. 
 Welfare Regime Typology:  In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-
Andersen argues that the welfare system is a “stratification system in its own right,” and 
is therefore able to categorize countries into three distinctive regimes (1990:3).  
Researchers used Esping-Andersen’s conceptualization of ‘three worlds’ as a framework 
to explain differences in countries across regime types and discover variations within the 
same regime. 
Welfare states vary along multiple dimensions, such as socialism, conservatism, 
liberalism, and de-commodification (Esping-Andersen 1990).  The most important 
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dimension is de-commodification: the “degree to which individuals can uphold a socially 
acceptable standard of living independent of market participation” and “opt out of work 
when they consider it necessary without the potential loss of job, income, or general 
welfare” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 37, 23).  By evaluating the extent to which countries’ 
social rights allow de-commodification, he discovered they clustered into three regimes 
(Social-Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative-Corporativist) with unique characteristics.   
These three regimes have different legacies, determining factors, and ways of 
distributing welfare.  They have distinct logics of organization, stratification, and social 
integration.  The Anglo-Saxon liberal model is minimally de-commodifying, meaning 
that it is characterized by means-tested assistance, modest cash transfers, or modest 
social-insurance that benefits low-income workers and encourages private welfare 
schemes (Esping-Andersen 1990).  On the opposite end is the Social Democratic regime, 
which promotes equality and de-commodification through universal benefits transfer 
programs (Esping-Andersen 1990).  In between these two models lie the ‘Conservative-
Corporativist’ welfare states of continental Europe.  Of the three typologies, the Christian 
Democratic (conservative-corporativist) states are the most heterogeneous (Huber and 
Stephens 2001: 90).  Arguably, some of Esping-Andersen’s Conservative-Corporativist 
welfare states varied enough to constitute a fourth regime type, the Southern 
Mediterranean Regime (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal).  The Southern Mediterranean 
regime is distinguished by its later development, its strongly divided “insider/outsider” 
labor market, and its extreme residual dependency on the family in the provision of 
welfare.  Across these four models, the welfare arrangements vary greatly.  This is 
especially apparent on the dimension which this essay investigates: the family.   
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Regimes’ Success with New Social Risks:  The patterns of distributing welfare in 
these regimes dictate how prepared these systems are for new social risks.  The Christian-
Democratic states seem to fit best with the old social risks (Huber and Stephens 2004).  
Although much less generous and comprehensive, the liberal regime also addresses old 
risks (Huber and Stephens 2004).  Yet individuals now need “new social risk policies” 
that include “spending for families (cash and services), active labor market policies, old 
age services, and social assistance (cash and services)” (Bonoli 2007: 508).  But in 
contrast to the other models, Huber and Stephens indicate that the Nordic welfare states 
of the social democratic regime seem better prepared, having “incorporated essential 
elements of the new welfare states for decades” (2004: 1).   
These regimes experienced varied success in adapting policies for the new social 
risks.  The social democratic countries of northern Europe are viewed as having the most 
generous and developed social protection systems (Bonoli 2007: 502).  They also lead as 
the best-adapted to the new social risks, particularly Sweden, Denmark, and Norway 
(Bonoli 2007: 508).  Christian-Democratic and liberal regimes “perform worse in dealing 
with new than with old social risks groups; in contrast Social Democratic welfare states 
are equally effective in dealing with both old and new risks” (Huber and Stephens 2004: 
2004: 16).  The countries of Southern Europe mark the extreme of the Christian-
Democratic states, traditionally performing the worst on these new risks.  They are 
developing social policies more intensively now than in the past, although for them there 
remains a long way to catch up (Moreno 2007).  In this way, welfare regimes evidently 
diverge more greatly in their ability to respond to new social risks than they did with the 
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old ones (Huber and Stephens 2004: 17).  Across these four models, the welfare systems 
exhibit especially varied responses to risks affecting families. 
  
 
 
II. NATIONAL APPROACHES TO FAMILY: SPAIN AND SWEDEN 
1.  EXAMINING FAMILY POLICY IN TWO EU MEMBER STATES 
Case studies:  This essay focuses upon two case studies, Spain and Sweden, 
selected because they highlight the incredibly diversity of welfare responses to families in 
the European Union.  Family policy is a social dimension in which the welfare regimes 
adopt extremely different approaches.  In particular, these countries represent two of the 
more strongly contrasting welfare regimes with regard to family, the Social-Democratic 
model and the Southern Mediterranean variant of the Christian-Democratic model.  The 
Southern Mediterranean model is marked as highly familial, illustrated in its striking 
reliance on the family to support itself without aid from the state or market.  In contrast, 
the Scandinavian social democratic model supports families almost entirely through state 
policy.  It is often considered successful in its ability to combine high levels of female 
labor force participation, family-friendly policies, and fertility.  Sweden is often taken as 
the exemplary case study for the Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen 1990, Huber 
and Stephens 2001), and Spain’s severe fertility rates and strains on the family make it 
the counter-example from the Southern-Mediterranean regime.   
In drawing examples from two different “welfare worlds,” this essay omits a 
discussion of the Anglo-Saxon liberal model’s approach to families.  However, to a large 
degree, the citizens in liberal welfare states must seek social provision privately in the 
market, with limited expectations for government intervention.  This contrasts with the 
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idea common to the other European welfare regimes that citizens are entitled to a publicly 
provided guarantee of welfare.  By examining their policies on female employment, 
reconciliation, and other family policies, this part prepares for the later analysis of the 
EU’s influence in these countries concerning family.   
 
2.   SPAIN AND SWEDEN’S WELFARE REGIMES 
Historical Legacies and Characteristics:  The historical legacies of these countries 
play a determining role in how their welfare systems adapt to new risks.  The Nordic 
countries’ strong labor movements and social democratic parties encouraged them to 
pursue full employment and generous social policies (Huber and Stephens 2004: 10).  
Significantly, the labor shortages of the 1960s resulted in women entering the labor force 
in large numbers in the Nordic states (Huber and Stephens 2004).  More women entering 
the labor market generated a greater demand for care services (Huber and Stephens 
2004).  Also, the emergence of the women’s movement also helped to establish a gender 
egalitarian agenda (Huber and Stephens 2004).  The social democratic party took up these 
movements’ concerns, introducing policy to respond to women’s needs for increased 
availability of public care.  The expansion of the service sector created new jobs, which 
were filled predominantly by women (Huber and Stephens 2004).  Further policy 
followed, including in Sweden, for example, the introduction of individual taxation in 
1971, preschool education in 1973, and parental leave in 1974 (Bonoli 2007).  By 1972, 
60% of Swedish women participated in the labor force (Bonoli 2007).  This support of 
women’s entry into paid employment led to a greater prevalence of dual earner or 1 ½ 
earner families.   
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 Meanwhile, in continental and southern Europe, Christian-Democratic parties 
continued to defend the traditional male breadwinner, and it was much more difficult for 
women’s movements to take hold (Huber and Stephens 2004).  In contrast to the Nordic 
states, female participation stayed around 50% until the late 1980s in continental and 
Southern Europe (Bonoli 2007).  These states did not develop full employment and 
generally lagged behind in supportive services for families.  Thus, the service sector 
remained small and women’s participation in the labor force remained low (Huber and 
Stephens 2004).  These countries used immigrants, not women, to meet the labor 
shortages of the 1960s.  The preference for the traditional family (male 
breadwinner/female housewife), a strong Catholic tradition, and the notion of subsidiarity 
acted as formative factors for this welfare regime (Huber and Stephens 2001).  Therefore, 
these states were historically pre-disposed to be less friendly toward redistribution and 
services, particularly for those replacing traditional family tasks like childcare (Bonoli 
2007).  The Southern Mediterranean, in contrast to other Christian-Democratic countries 
like France, Belgium, or Germany who introduced some family policy support, represents 
the extreme end of dependence on family networks to maintain their own family well-
being. 
 
3.   SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND FAMILIES 
 The effect of these legacies is marked in modern family policy in both countries, 
notably in their respective approaches to employment, youth, reconciliation and gender 
equality.  Sweden continues its greater universal support and work policies, addressing 
family and gender concerns “not as separate entities” but as concepts “closely interwoven 
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and constructed” (Bernhardt 2007).  Spain continues its traditional dependency on strong 
family networks for support.  However, some recalibration of the Southern 
Mediterranean model is needed to counter low fertility and facilitate female employment. 
Employment:  Spain’s welfare system traditionally supported a male 
breadwinner model for work and family.  As such, it is not surprising that a 1990 survey 
found that around 40% of Spanish women had never worked a consecutive period of 
twelve months, compared to the EU average of 17% (Bernhardt 2007: 2).  Around 2000, 
Spain was found to have the lowest rate (approx. 50%) of female labor force participation 
for women aged 25-49 years old (Bernhardt 2007: 1).  However, this has improved 
greatly in the last decade, up to almost 64% by 2005 (Eurostat).  Yet when Spanish 
women entered into paid work, it caused a high level of separation between sex, age, and 
those inside and outside of the labor market (Flaquer 2000:13).  Spain’s ‘old’ welfare 
state arrangements provided job security for male breadwinners, separating women and 
youth in particular as “outsiders.”  In this way, women and youth are more precarious, 
experiencing greater difficulties in obtaining stable employment (Moreno 2006a).  This in 
turn perpetuates strong inequalities and difficulties with reconciliation (Flaquer 2000).   
 In contrast, women’s right to work is a “distinctive tenet” of the Scandinavian 
countries (Bernhardt 2007).  Sweden consistently has one of the highest rates of female 
labor force participation in the EU, with close to 80% of women aged 25-49 working 
(Bernhardt 2007).  In contrast to Spain’s traditional support to male breadwinners, 
Sweden introduced policies to facilitate women’s employment in the early 1970s.  For 
example, its policy of individual taxation acts as an incentive for dual-earner families, 
allowing the second earner to profit more from their income (Jordan 2006).  It is 
 19 
important to note that Swedish women largely entered into paid employment in the public 
service sector and continue to work in care and social services to a disproportionate 
degree than in other sectors.  In this way, Sweden’s labor market exhibits gender and 
sectoral segregation.  However, in contrast to other countries, a female-heavy sector does 
not mean that it consists of low-wage occupations. 
 Also, the use of part-time employment is starkly different in Spain and Sweden.  
In Sweden, high numbers of women work long-term in paid employment.  However, 
part-time work and short-term career interruptions are frequent.  In Spain, smaller 
proportions of women enter the workforce at all but, when employed, seldom use 
parental leaves or use part-time work options.  Only 19% of working mothers work less 
than 30 hours a week in Spain (Tobío 2005).  In fact, 62% of these women work more 
than 40 hours a week (Tobío 2005).  Considering that part-time work is almost 
exclusively performed by women, these figures indicate the limited use of part-time work 
in general (Tobío 2005).  Many Spanish women admit the desire to work less (Tobío 
2005), yet they do not work part-time or use short-term leave options.  Spanish women’s 
low use of these recourses underlines their difficulties in securing employment and the 
negative consequences of career interruptions to their earning and advancement potential. 
 Closely connected to labor force participation and family formation are policies 
concerning youth.  Their ability to transition to adulthood and independence affects the 
timing of marriage and children.  Sweden largely succeeds in activating youth to the 
labor market.  To help them transition to adulthood, youth are provided with social 
transfers (Biggart and Kovacheva 2006).  In contrast, Spain provides little state support 
for its youth.  The difficulty in finding employment and the extremely high prices of 
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housing postpone Spanish youths’ economic independence.  In the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, youth are three times more likely than their northern 
counterparts to live at home at age twenty-three (Biggart and Kovacheva 2006).  These 
factors inhibiting personal and financial autonomy consequently also impede the 
formation of families (Addis 1999).  Not surprisingly, Spain’s welfare system exhibits 
signs of strain, evident in delayed family formation and reduced fertility. 
 Reconciliation and Care:  Spanish women shoulder particularly heavy 
responsibilities in providing care.  The previous generation of women, under Franco, was 
limited to the role of housewife.  The expectation for women to continue their unpaid 
domestic work prevails, however, despite the fact that the majority of this generation of 
Spanish women are now in paid employment.  These “superwomen” must confront dual 
challenges, fulfilling both work and family responsibility (Moreno 2006b).  Spanish men 
do not contribute significantly more to domestic duties despite the increased entry of 
women to work.  For example, a survey revealed that Spanish men did not contribute 
more than women on any of eighteen various domestic duties (Tobío 2005).  Women 
performed significantly more cleaning, washing clothes, and food preparation (Tobío 
2005).  Although younger Spanish couples divide the tasks more equally, it is clear that 
men do not substitute for women at home when women enter the workforce.  Fathers’ 
help exhibits a more complementary role, not a principal strategy, in reconciliation for 
most Spanish families (Tobío 2005).  Men are not viewed as the principal tool for 
reconciliation in Sweden either.  Swedish men perform better than Spanish men in 
helping domestically, but still participate at much lower levels than women.  In contrast 
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to Spain, however, Sweden counteracts this effect with state policy, using daycare as the 
primary reconciliation strategy.  
The principal strategy in reconciliation for Spanish women is supportive family 
networks, most commonly help from the maternal grandmother (Tobío 2005).  From the 
previous generation of housewives, these grandmothers relieve their daughters of some 
guilt, are available in emergencies, and are a cost-free resource (Tobío 2005).  This 
solution fits well within Spain’s traditional family and welfare arrangements because it 
depends on family solidarity.  There is strong intergenerational solidarity that allows 
family members care for one another.  Reliance upon these networks strengthens 
intergenerational ties within a family, seen particularly in the care connections between 
grandmothers, mothers, and grandchildren.  Yet it also perpetuates gendered expectations 
for care.  There is doubt whether today’s working women will be willing or able to 
reciprocate this help for their daughters in the future (Tobío 2005).  Therefore, this 
strategy does not seem adequate and sustainable, and some recalibration of the Spanish 
welfare system is needed. 
As noted above, public day care services represent the principal resource and 
reconciliation strategy in Sweden.  Daycare is universally provided and widely available 
there (Gornick and Meyers 2003, Bernhardt 2007).  This begins early, aiding mothers 
with young children.  The welfare state entitles all children older than 18 months to 
publicly provided childcare (Jordan 2006).  These state policies reflect an expectation for 
women to continue as workers in addition to child-rearing.  The availability of daycare 
acknowledges this expectation and tries to facilitate reconciliation.  The Swedish model 
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for childcare follows more closely Gornick and Meyer’s concept of “children as public 
goods,” the assumption that society benefits as a whole from the care given to children. 
 Spanish daycare’s limited availability and operating hours determine that it will 
not represent a principal strategy for reconciliation.  The slow development of the public 
care sector reflects a continued Catholic ideology that it is better for mothers to care for 
their young children themselves (Naldini 2003).  Spain provides universal public schools 
and, since 1975, many pre-school centers for children older than three years.  However, 
there is little support for the very young (Crompton 2006).  There is a high demand that 
goes unmet for childcare facilities for young children (MTAS 2004).  For example, in 
2004, Spain could not cover the childcare demands of 88.3% of mothers with a child less 
than one year-old, 62.4% of those with a child aged 1-2, and 34.2% for those with a child 
aged 2-3 years (MTAS 2004).  Other problems with this reconciliation option include 
when children become sick and the incompatibility of daycare hours with work 
schedules.  These centers often open after the workday begins, close for lunch, and close 
again before the workday ends.  Additionally they have longer holiday periods than work 
holidays.   In conclusion, public daycare is the primary reconciliation tool in Sweden but 
would need considerable change to become more influential in Spain. 
Family Allowances and Leaves:  Spain traditionally tried to encourage family 
formation by providing cash transfers for children, instead of offering publicly provided 
services.  In 1994, Spanish fathers became eligible to receive one year credit toward their 
pension for each child (Naldini 2003).  Sweden also promotes generous child allowances.  
There is a basic allowance for all children up to age 16, an additional child allowance for 
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families with three or more children, and student grants to help after the age of 16 
(Bernhardt 2007). 
Sweden encourages employment by improving options for flexible work hours 
and parental leave (Bernhardt 2007).  There are also generous benefits to promote 
mothers to work continuously and to encourage fathers to take a more active part in care 
(Gornick and Meyers 2003).  For instance, Sweden enables parents with children less 
than eight years old to legally reduce their workday from eight to six hours (Jordan 
2006).  Also, parents are allowed up to sixty days for child sick leave and one year for 
parental leave at a 90% wage replacement rate (Jordan 2006).  This parental insurance is 
applied to fathers as well as to mothers in order to encourage men to participate in care.  
Specifically, Sweden also offers paternal leaves, non-transferable entitlements that are 
lost if not used by the father.  These policies, provided with high wage replacement in 
Sweden, increase the likelihood that fathers will use them.  Through these leaves, 85% of 
Swedish fathers take at least two months of leave from work to stay with their children 
(Bernhardt 2007).   
Spanish mothers were offered maternity leave for six weeks before childbirth and 
eight weeks afterward at a 75% wage replacement rate (extended to 17 weeks in 1989) 
(Tobío 2005).  Fathers can take ten of the seventeen weeks for parental leave.  Both 
parents are eligible to take a three year unpaid leave.  However, since families can choose 
who will take the leave (no benefits exist exclusively for the father), they are almost 
entirely used by women (Almendros 2002).  Furthermore, even the policies for Spanish 
working mothers often go unused, suggesting they are not making a helpful impact.  
According to a study in 1995, only 2% of Spanish women with children younger than 
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three utilized their parental leave (Deven, Inglis, Moss, and Petrie 1997).  This trend 
continues today, with only 11% of all working mothers utilizing some kind of work leave 
to care for their children, usually for less than one year (Tobío 2005).  This limited take-
up highlights once again the difficulties in securing a job and the penalties for career 
interruptions which force Spanish working women to find other reconciliation solutions if 
they want to have children. 
There is some evidence that Spain has recognized a need to update its 
reconciliation policies.  Spain introduced changes in parental leave through the Law for 
the Reconciliation of Working and Family Life of Working People (LCVFL) following 
an EU directive (96/34/CE).  Through the LCVFL, maternal leaves, reduced working 
days for the care of children, and a suspension of the work contract for family reasons 
became permitted (Almendros 2002).  However, this law and family benefits do not help 
in cases of child sickness, which is reported to be the most difficult issue for 
reconciliation (Tobío 2005).  Spanish women consequently remain unable to resolve 
reconciliation through the policies currently available.   
Fertility:  The difficulties in reconciliation correlate with questions of fertility, 
suggesting that the Swedish model better allows women to pursue work and family 
simultaneously than the Spanish model.  All throughout the western world, fertility rates 
are below the population replacement rate, which is an average of 2.1 children per 
woman.  The Scandinavian countries continue to maintain relatively high fertility levels, 
however, despite greater numbers of women working (Gornick and Meyers 2003).  
Sweden’s fertility rates were one of Europe’s closest to the desired 2.1 (Fernández 2007).  
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Notably, Swedish mothers do not seem to limit the number of children they have because 
of work (Bernhardt 2007).   
 Spain suffers, however, from incredibly low levels of fertility, in fact, some of the 
lowest in the world and in history (European Commission 2007, Flaquer 2000: 17).  At 
the turn of the 21st century, Spanish women were only having 1.18 children (European 
Commission 1998: 5-6).  As noted earlier, these lower fertility rates do not reflect a 
diminished desire to have children.  On average, Spanish women have 0.5 less children 
than their ideal number (Moreno 2006: 10).  The difficulties in finding employment and 
affording housing make Spanish youth precarious during their most fertile years (Addis 
1999: 12).  Postponed autonomy also contributes to delays in marriage and childbearing.  
For instance, motherhood has been postponed in Spain to an average age of thirty for the 
birth of the first child (Chinchilla and Moragas 2007).  Furthermore, the lack of state 
provisions for childcare, maternal, paternal, and parental leaves, combined with the fact 
that today women cannot or do not want to leave the labor market upon having children, 
seems to have contributed to the reduction in fertility (Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003: 
74).  In of the face of poor support for reconciliation, some Spanish women decide upon 
“extreme” reconciliation strategies, such as reducing the number of children or not 
having children at all (Tobío 2005).   
Implications:  Support for families in Spain is marked by a continued reliance 
upon strong family networks, while Sweden represents a determined effort to aid the 
family, promote gender equality, and encourage both parents to be earners and care-
givers.  Examining the historical legacies of the national welfare states suggested the 
approaches of welfare states to be path-dependent.  Secondly, a contrast of Spain and 
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Sweden’s family policies illustrated how the diverse approaches to female employment, 
youth, reconciliation, and other family policies corresponded to differences in outcomes.  
The Spanish model already appears to be struggling to cope with NSRs facing families as 
noted by the drastically low fertility rates and unmet demands for services for families. 
New social risks and fertility pressures underline that some national welfare states must 
adjust to cope with new demands, or recalibrate their welfare models.  From this analysis 
arose the implications that Sweden’s solid policies establish it is a ‘best practice’ case, 
while Spain needs welfare reform to adapt to the new risks facing families.  This essay 
now will analyze the extent to which a recalibration of welfare for families is envisioned 
and enacted in an EU context. 
  
 
 
III. FAMILY AS AN EU CONCERN 
This part will examine the way in which the EU tries to foster coordination 
between member-states on family issues.  Secondly, it will address EU targets for 
families in female labor force participation, reconciliation, and gender equality and what 
progress has been made on an EU level.  Finally, it will assess any perceived 
Europeanization effect in policies toward families in Spain and Sweden and locate this 
inside the debate on EU social policy.   
 
1.  BECOMING AN EU CONCERN 
Contemporary developments are not necessarily covered by traditional national 
welfare programs (Moreno and Palier 2005: 1) and neither are they limited to them in 
scope.  Despite dissimilar pasts and approaches, European states share a continued 
prioritization of social welfare along with economic progress.  Specific projects that 
promote social dialogue and progress toward family concerns have begun to emerge on 
an EU level.  The EU does not introduce policy single-handedly, but instead induces 
progress toward mutually identifiable goals in its member states.  As seen through its 
targets and prescriptions for family policy, however, the EU increasingly intervenes to 
encourage national welfare states to recalibrate to the new social challenges.  These EU 
targets mark its primary tool of soft policy, meaning that the EU encourages member-
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states to follow EU social agenda through the introduction of recommendations, 
proposals, and calls for change.   
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) efforts to bring the EU targets for 
female employment, reconciliation, and gender equality to the attention of the EU 
member states deserves examination.  The Lisbon Summit established the OMC as its 
primary instrument to stimulate member-states to progress toward social objectives.  
Significantly, it does not have the authority to direct European legislation or create "hard 
law" in employment and social-protection (Scharpf 2002).  With the OMC, voluntary 
decisions to follow policy remain at the national level.  In this way, nation states must 
willingly cooperate for the OMC to be effective.   
However, the OMC stimulates the different member-states to embrace 
comparative learning.  The OMC thus “provides a framework for cooperation between 
member-states, whose national policies can be thus directed toward common objectives” 
(www.europa.eu).  The OMC tools for developing convergence include the creation of 
common guidelines, national action plans, peer reviews, joint evaluation reports, and 
recommendations.  In this way, both objectives and policy choices become defined as a 
matter of common concern, as will be examined in the goals and progress for female 
employment and childcare outlined at the Lisbon and Barcelona summits.  Through the 
OMC and thus the EU, states try to reach agreement on common objectives and set 
common indicators of achievement to measure progress (Scharpf 2002).  Furthermore, 
there is a type of peer accountability as the national governments present their plans for 
discussion and peer review.  This encourages states to make some progress despite the 
voluntary nature of EU social agreements.  The EU now acts upon new social risks, 
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identifying goals and prescribing targets for female employment, reconciliation, and 
gender equality.   
EU Targets and Progress for the Family 
There is a sense that female labor participation is the key for employment and 
economic growth in Europe (European Commission 2007).  At the European Council in 
Lisbon in 2000, the EU created a developmental plan for progress that called for both 
economic and social progress.  In this Lisbon Strategy, also known as the Lisbon Agenda 
or Process, the EU aims to “become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion” (www.europa.eu).  Notably, the Lisbon Strategy hoped to 
achieve 60% of women in paid employment by 2010.  In fact, progress toward this target 
has been achieved; female employment rose from 53.7% in 2000 to 57.2% in 2006 
(www.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).  Women have filled six of the eight million new jobs in the 
EU since the Lisbon objectives were set (European Commission 2007: 5).  However, in 
order to progress toward the Lisbon objective for female employment, the EU sought to 
remove obstacles to women’s entry into paid work, by facilitating reconciliation and 
promoting gender equality. 
The difficulties of reconciliation commonly inhibit women’s labor force 
participation.  Working women often are hindered in developing their professional life by 
the continued burden of domestic and family responsibilities.  Particularly, duties in 
child-rearing negatively affect their ability to participate in the workforce.  Strikingly, 
female employment in the EU between ages 20-49 drops by 15% upon having a child, 
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compared to a 6 % increase for men1 (European Commission 2007).  As noted earlier, 
problems with reconciliation for young families are evident through the postponement of 
family formation and lower rates of fertility.  In order to counter these effects, the EU 
sought to minimize the disincentives to combining work with having a family.   
The EU developed policies to help facilitate women’s entry into work by 
promoting public childcare provision.  For instance, the EU’s Fourth Action Program 
(1996-2000), first defined reconciliation of work and family life as a problem for both 
women and men (Edquist 2006).  The EU promoted the development of reconciliation 
tools, recommending (9/241/CEE) that childcare services should be economically 
accessible, offer serious care (with respect to health and safety), and provide a broad 
education (MTAS 2004).  In Barcelona in 2002, the EU elaborated on the Lisbon 
Strategy to design specific objectives for public childcare provision.  Explicitly, it 
targeted increased care coverage to at least 90% of children between three years-old and 
the mandatory school age as well as to 33% of children under three years old (Plantenga 
2004).  A few countries, generally the Nordic ones, have already met or exceeded the 
Lisbon and Barcelona objectives.  For instance, Sweden scores rather favorably on both 
employment and the targeted amount of daycare for children.  Many more countries meet 
the target of childcare provision for children between three years-old and school age, 
including both Sweden and Spain (Plantenga 2004).  However, Spain was one of the 
lowest scoring EU members for the younger age bracket, with less than 10% availability 
(Plantenga 2004).  These comparative figures themselves reflect an increasing EU trend 
to measure and evaluate gender and family issues across member-states. 
                                                 
1
 This figure reflects an EU average that did not include data from DK, IE, or SE. (Eurostat Labor Force 
Survey, annual averages 2005; as cited in European Commission 2007). 
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In addition to challenges with reconciliation, another inhibitor to women’s labor 
force participation is the persistent inequalities they confront.  Women frequently occupy 
a much less favorable situation in the labor market than men.  Major gender gaps exist in 
employment and pay, which are “always to women’s disadvantage” (European 
Commission 2007: 5).  The pay gap between men and women persists, with women 
making 15% less than men for every hour worked (Plantenga 2004).  Moreover, gender 
divisions persist with regard to the type of jobs women take.  Women are much less 
likely than men to be in decision-making positions, despite often higher levels of 
education (European Commission 2007).  They typically take jobs in the service sector.  
Additionally, women participate in part-time work at much higher rates then men.  
Almost one-third of women work part-time (32.9% in 2006), compared to only 7.7% of 
men (European Commission 2007).  Part-time work often makes it more difficult to 
achieve career advancement, higher income earnings, and to obtain benefits.  These 
inequalities reduce the advantages of having a second income-earner in a family.  Women 
therefore confront prevalent challenges to equality when entering into paid employment. 
As a result, the EU prescribes improved gender equality policy to counteract the 
inequalities that deter women from work.  The EU recognizes gender equality policy as 
fundamental to fostering economic and demographic growth.  The Spring European 
Council of 2006 stressed that policies on gender equality are essential instruments for 
economic growth, prosperity, and competitiveness (Edquist 2006).  It further recognized 
gender equality policies as a necessary step toward reaching the Lisbon objectives.  As 
part of this progress toward the Lisbon Agenda, the EU encouraged “gender 
mainstreaming,” meaning that the EU systematically tries to consider all policy from a 
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gender perspective at its conception and thus continue to make advancements (Plantenga, 
Remery, and Rubery 2007).  Additionally, the EU established specific projects to further 
this goal, namely the Institute for Gender and the EU Pact for Gender Equality.  The Pact 
targets the implementation of policies promoting female employment and reconciliation 
as a way to meet the demographic change.  Some progress has been achieved; the gap in 
employment rates between men and women was reduced to 15 points by 2005, especially 
low in youth aged 15-24 (5.9%) (European Commission 2007).  
With regard to these issues relating to family, the EU increasingly identifies 
priority concerns and follows with specific policy prescriptions.  The Lisbon, Barcelona, 
and gender equality targets indicate member-states’ shared expectations to combine 
economic advancement with social provision.  The OMC’s tool of “benchmarking” 
served to establish comparisons by identifying best practices among the EU member-
states.  The Nordic states already fare well on the goals for female employment, 
childcare, and gender equality.  In this way, the Nordic states seem to stand out as ‘best 
practice’ cases in their ability to resolve the new risks facing families.  The EU uses 
benchmarking to advance toward the best-performing countries’ models, thus promoting 
imitation of good practices and programs.  In fact, the EU recommendations and action 
addressing these issues demonstrate a close resemblance to the Nordic model of social 
provision.  These tools seem to help in convergence on social policy (Moreno and Palier 
2005: 33).  In this way, the EU hopes to utilize the OMC to promote policy learning in 
member-states and help them to address the new social risks facing families. 
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2.  EUROPEANIZATION EFFECTS IN SPAIN AND SWEDEN 
Spain’s original extremity in depending on family networks makes its progress 
toward EU social goals more marked.  This in turn suggests there is potential for the EU 
to influence on Spain’s social policy.  Spain has experienced some difficulty in executing 
plans to improve gender equality and female employment (Edquist 2006).  Its public 
support for families is underdeveloped and requires improvement to achieve these EU 
goals.  Yet the OMC seems particularly geared toward the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean (de la Porte and Pochet 2004: 75).  Consequently, in Spain, the OMC does 
appear to be making progress toward EU goals.  Spain developed a “New Social 
Contract,” similar to EU family projects, targeting a more equitable balance between men 
and women in work and care, more women in higher-paid employment, and increased 
part-time work opportunities (as long as they did not mark an exclusively female domain) 
(Edquist 2006).  Also, the introduction of the laws toward reconciliation (1999) and for 
gender equality (2007) further underline Spain’s efforts to readjust its family policies to 
fall closer in line with EU goals.  Therefore, the OMC and other soft policy initiatives 
have helped Spain in its convergence with EU social targets (Guillén and Álvarez 2004).  
There is a certain “Europeanization of social policy that has evolved over time and to 
which Spain is attracted” (Guillén and Álvarez 2004).  As Spain introduces new efforts 
for family policy, the EU seems to exert a more direct and significant influence on 
Spanish social policy (Guillén and Álvarez 2004: 5). 
It is difficult to assess to what degree the OMC has ‘Europeanized’ Sweden 
because many of the Nordic countries already score well on EU targets.  Sweden is eager 
to place employment high on the EU agenda (Jacobsson 2003), yet Sweden and Denmark 
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have surpassed the EU employment targets consistently for years.  In many cases, these 
countries have set more ambitious goals than the EU.  For instance, Sweden wants to 
have 80% of the population aged 20-64 in regular employment (Jacobsson 2003).  The 
EU recommends that Sweden reduce the gender segregation in the labor market, which 
has resulted in some government action programs.  Gender segregation in Sweden, 
however, does not mean that female workers earn lower wages in the way that women 
working in female sectors in other countries do.  Overall, Hemerijck suggests that 
Scandinavia represents a ‘best practice’ in the availability of “women-friendly policy” 
(2002: 200).   
There does not seem to be a clear causal link between the OMC and greater 
convergence in Sweden.  The goodness of fit between EU social targets and Sweden’s 
existing policy makes it difficult to discern a clear impact of the EU’s OMC (Jacobsson 
2003: 24).  In particular, EU goals for female employment, reconciliation, and gender 
equality strongly resemble the existing Swedish targets.  In fact, Sweden seems more 
willing to support cooperation when it already has implemented the objectives in question 
(Jacobsson 2003: 17).  Interviews confirm that Sweden is interested in greater 
information exchange, learning how other countries’ policies function, and in the 
exchange of best practice (Jacobsson 2003: 14).  In a sense, Sweden regards its measures 
as a “good practice” which it is willing to share with others (Interview with the Swedish 
Ministry of Social Affairs, as cited in Jacobsson 2003).  This sense of sharing their good 
system without feeling much pressure to converge could explain the favorable attitude of 
Sweden toward the OMC.    
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3.  IMPLICATIONS 
There is evident divergence on family policy in the mere two states examined in 
this work.  It has been suggested that there is more variation between European countries 
than between the EU and the US (Alber 2006).  Considering that there are twenty-five 
other EU member-states with their own inherent social issues, any conceptualization of a 
single European Social Model (ESM) is extremely complex.  Also, there is doubt on 
whether states would be willing to coordinate on sensitive issues like welfare and social 
policy if they feared an EU social track might jeopardize their national welfare 
arrangements (Mau 2005).   In this way, it is not surprising that this “Achilles heel” 
(Delors, as cited in Mau 2005), European social integration, has been difficult to define 
and develop.  Yet there does seem to be a common thread to European social policy, a 
shared prioritization of the social dimension that offers collective unity and identity to 
most EU countries (Moreno and Palier 2005).  The European-wide continued concern for 
insuring social well-being enables the establishment of goals and targets for social policy 
progress. 
The EU increasingly encourages common targets for families and advancement 
toward mutually agreed goals.  These targets strongly resemble the family-friendly 
policies of Sweden and the Nordic states.  In particular, the emphasis on increasing 
employment for all adults suggests that convergence in EU social policy will more 
closely follow the Swedish system (Annesley 2007: 195).   However, this minimizes 
Sweden’s need to converge.  In contrast, most of the pressure to converge falls on the 
countries of the Southern Mediterranean.  The OMC seems desirable and productive for 
the straggling member-states, like Spain, whose traditional policies result in strains for 
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modern families.  Indeed, it is easier to discern progress toward EU targets in countries 
like Spain, where more progress is needed.   
Traditional welfare states that struggle to address NSRs, like Spain, can use EU 
policy initiatives as an excuse to introduce much-needed reforms.  The EU coordinates 
different national approaches to address common demands.  It also helps states 
recalibrate their family policy to follow ‘best practice’ targets for reconciliation and 
gender equality.  In this way, the new social risks facing families present an opportunity 
for the EU to become more involved in social policy.  With regard to these risks, the EU 
influence is “not insignificant, and contrasts with its otherwise limited capacity to 
intervene in policy areas in which the member states feel they must keep under national 
control” (Palier 2003).  Of course, member-states have their own historical legacies that 
appear to be path-dependent, especially in relation to their approach to family.  The 
social-democratic countries’ traditional practices led them to generally fare well with 
these new risks, becoming a model of “best practice” within the EU.  Countries with 
more traditional national welfare systems did not address the new social risks as well and 
struggle to introduce reform on a national level.  It is in these countries, however, where 
the EU targets and peer review seem to have a more clear influence, albeit moderate and 
slowly developing.  This suggests that the EU can have a positive influence in 
recalibrating family welfare and improve the reconciliation standards more generally.  
Indeed, as these new social concerns continue to have economic and demographic 
significance, the EU’s targets female employment, reconciliation, and gender equality 
become more influential. 
  
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 This essay argues that the European Union can potentially help its member-states 
that are weak on family policy to recalibrate their welfare to address the new social risks 
facing families.  The first part describes how the new social risks facing families generate 
a debate on proper social responses that is answered with varied success by different 
welfare regimes.  Social transformations from “old social risks” to “new social risks” 
strained traditional welfare systems, especially with regard to family concerns.  Debates 
on social protection that would address these challenges for families suggest that modern 
welfare programs should promote the reconciliation of work and family life, gender 
equality, and family support.  Welfare regimes respond to these new social demands with 
varying levels of state support; the Southern Mediterranean states struggle to adapt while 
the Scandinavian welfare states seem better prepared.   
The second part of the essay examines national approaches to family as seen in 
Spain and Sweden.  It argues that distinct historical legacies acted as a determining factor 
for modern welfare arrangements, focusing particularly on their divergent approaches to 
family policy.  Sweden’s state support and Spain’s reliance on the family are reflected in 
their policies toward labor force participation, reconciliation, and other family policies.  
Fertility levels underline the respective success and failure of these national welfare states 
to resolve the risks facing families.  Sweden, with its long-established programs for 
female employment, daycare, and gender equality, appears more capable of sustaining 
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both female employment and high fertility levels.  In contrast, familial Spain struggles 
with high unemployment and low fertility rates, underlining the long-term strains of little 
reconciliation policy.  Success in dealing with new social risks appears to result from 
their respective historical legacies, and states continue to make the final determination of 
national welfare policy.   
From considering this need to recalibrate family welfare policy, the third part 
transitions to argue that social projects increasingly emerge on a European level.  By 
clearly addressing new social risks and identifying targets for improvement, the EU has 
taken preliminary steps toward establishing an influence in the social policy realm.  In 
fact, both Sweden and Spain are now actively participating at the EU level to increase the 
exchange of information and best practice in the Open Method of Coordination.  The 
European Union increasingly plays a greater role in policy coordination as it targets 
improvements in female labor force participation, reconciliation, and gender equality.  
The ‘Europeanization effect’ of these targets and the Open Method of Coordination are 
more evident in lagging countries (Spain) than those who already fare well on the new 
social risks for families (Sweden). Consequently, this exchange has reinforced the Nordic 
states (Sweden) as best practice and brought much pressure to bear on Southern Europe 
to improve their family policy.  Spain does reflect this ‘Europeanization effect,’ which 
suggests that there now is an increased EU influence on social policy more generally 
(Guillén and Álvarez 2004, Moreno and Palier 2005).  Spanish progress, although 
moderate, toward resolving the new social risks facing families now seems significantly 
bound to targets on an EU level.  As national welfare states like Spain assimilate EU 
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targets, it implies that the European Union has the potential to exercise a more 
pronounced role in social policy convergence. 
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